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I.   INTRODUCTION
It was supposed to be big. The media hailed United States v. Single-
ton1 a “bombshell,”2 comparing the decision to the likes of Miranda.3 In-
deed, a panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals shocked the criminal
justice community when it ruled that federal prosecutors who cut deals
with witnesses in exchange for the witnesses’ testimony are committing
a crime.4 Specifically, the court held that the government’s offer of leni-
ency to a witness, in exchange for a witness’ testimony against the ac-
cused, violated the federal “anti-gratuity” statute.5 The panel theorized
that if a prosecutor dangles a reduced sentence before a defendant, it is
likely that the defendant will testify the way the government wants–even
                                                                                                                                                
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Florida State University College of Law. The author thanks
Rocco Cafaro and the Florida State University Law Review editorial staff for their assistance in
editing this Note. Also, the author expresses special gratitude to his wife, Joanne, for her never-
ending patience and support.
1. 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. de-
nied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (U.S. June 21, 1999) (No. 98-8758).
2. Judicial Trouble, WASH. POST , July 8, 1998, at A16 (referring to the Singleton panel
decision as a “bombshell”); see also Naftali Bendavid, Ruling on leniency deals raises outcry,
CHI . T RIB., July 15, 1998, at 1 (saying that the Singleton decision “stunned the l egal commu-
nity”); Julie Delcour, No deal? Controversial leniency ruling put on hold by 10th Circuit, TULSA
WORLD , July 12, 1998 (stating that the Singleton decision “lit up the legal landscape like a thou -
sand Roman candles”).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Jeffrey H. Kass, Trades of Leniency
for Testimony are Jeopardized by Court Ruling , SALT LAKE TRIB., July 19, 1998, at A2 (pre-
dicting that the Singleton decision “may in fact be as well-known as Miranda [sic] in the years
to come”).
4. See  Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1352.
5. See  id .; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
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if it means being untruthful.6 In summarizing the panel’s major conten-
tion, Judge Paul J. Kelly Jr. wrote, “If justice is perverted when a crimi-
nal defendant seeks to buy testimony from a witness, it is no less per-
verted when the government does so.”7 “The judicial process is tainted
and justice is cheapened when factual testimony is purchased, whether
with leniency or money.”8
Believing that such a decision was long overdue, criminal defense
lawyers exulted and claimed vindication.9 Leading members of the Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers exclaimed, “The court
has ended decades of government-sanctioned bribery . . . [a] system in
which the government could exchange freedom for a story they wanted
to hear is a system rampant with injustice and half-truths.” 10 “The enor-
mous power of the government to lock up a defendant for life, or to free
him altogether, creates an enormous incentive [for a testifying co-
conspirator] to lie.” 11 “This decision puts us where we should have been
all along–bring in your facts, don’t bring in these bought and paid for
witnesses.”12
Accordingly, federal judges in almost every state were confronted
with hopeful defense lawyers filing so-called “Singleton  motions” in their
respective cases to have informant testimony thrown out. Debate re-
garding the validity of the Singleton opinion raged like a wildfire
throughout the criminal justice community. Several district courts out-
side the Tenth Circuit fanned the fire by choosing to follow the panel’s
reasoning, reaching the same conclusion: Federal prosecutors violate
federal statutory law when they offer a witness leniency in exchange for
testimony.13
But the assault on the commonly used prosecution tactic was short-
lived, and courts across the nation have been climbing over top of each
other to snuff out the potential Singleton inferno. The Tenth Circuit it-
self swiftly vacated (and eventually reversed) the panel’s decision.14 In
                                                                                                                                                
6. See  Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1360.
7. Id. at 1346.
8. Id. at 1347.
9. Prosecutors, on the contrary, were not so enthusiastic. The Chicago Daily Law Bulle-
tin noted, “to prosecutors, the decision was as welcome as Albert Belle at a children’s Hallow-
een Party.” David C. Gleicher, CHI . L. BULL., January 20, 1999.
10. Lyle Denniston, Leniency: Is it a break or a bribe?, BALTIMORE SUN, July 12, 1998, at
2A (quoting Larry Pozner, President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
11. Joan Biskupic, Justice Dept. to Appeal Court Ban on ‘Deals’ With Witnesses, WASH.
POST , July 10, 1998, at A3 (quoting Gerald B. Lefcourt, past-president of the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
12. World News Tonight With Peter Jennings: Bombshell Ruling by Federal Appeals
Court, No More Buying Testimony With A Plea Bargain (ABC television broadcast, July 9,
1998) (quoting Larry Pozner).
13. See  United States v. Mays, No. 97-CR-127 (E.D. Tenn. 1998); see also United States v.
Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (agreeing with Singleton that the plain
meaning of § 201(c)(2) encompasses government), rev’d, 166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Fraguela, No. Crim. A. 96-0339, 1998 WL 560352, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1998)
(adopting Singleton and Lowery), order vacated on reconsideration, No. Crim. A. 96-339
(E.D. La. 1998); United States v. Revis, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (N.D. Okla. 1998).
14. See  United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 2371 (U.S. June 21, 1999) (No. 98-8758). Six members of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals joined Judge Porfilio’s majority opinion (Anderson, Baldock, Tacha, Briscoe, Brorby,
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addition, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits have all addressed the Singleton issue within the last year,
rushing to extinguish any further combustion that might be created as a
result of the panel’s decision and, arguably, giving short shrift to the
heart of the panel’s argument.15 A veritable onslaugt of district courts
have dutifully responded to the alarm in a fashion, which—in the kindest
way—can only be termed as “piling on.”16 In doing so, courts have em-
ployed a variety of hypertechnical and conflicting arguments to counter
the Singleton  decision and avoid what many would consider a cata-
strophic result.17
Largely unanswered, however, is the Singleton  panel’s major conten-
tion: “Government leniency in exchange for testimony can create a pow-
erful incentive to lie and derail the truth-seeking purpose of the criminal
                                                                                                                                                
and Murphy, JJ). See  id.  Judge Henry and Lucero both filed concurrences with Judge Henry
joining Judge Lucero’s. See  id.  Judge Kelly furnished the dissent, joined by Chief Judge
Seymour and Judge Ebel, keeping the original panel intact. See  id.  at 1308.
15. See  United States v. Carroll, 166 F.3d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Web-
ster, 162 F.3d 308, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting Singleton on plain error review); United
States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting Singleton and noting that circuit
precedent has “consistently . . . upheld government efforts to provide benefits to witnesses in
exchange for testimony”); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 418-19 (6th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Condon, 170 F. 3d 687 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Johnson, 169 F.3d 1092, 1098
(8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Briones, 165 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 987 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
16. See  United States v. Barbaro, No. 98C.R.412 (JFK), 1998 WL 556152, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 1, 1998) (rejecting Singleton because of the historical acceptance of leniency in exchange
for truthful testimony); United States v. Juncal, No. 97C.R.1162 (JFK), 1998 WL 525800, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1998) (relying on the historical acceptance of leniency in exchange for testi-
mony and on canon of statutory construction requiring that government be expressly included
in statutory text to come with statute’s purview); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 535
(E.D. Va. 1998); United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 721 (E.D. Mich. 1998); United
States v. Dunlap, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Colo. 1998); United States v. Pungitore, 15 F. Supp. 2d
705, 711 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1998); United States v. Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 (S.D. Fla.
1998); United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521, 521-22 (D. Md. 1998) (criticizing Sin -
gleton’s reasoning, particularly application of the exclusionary rule); United States v. Gabourel,
9 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (D. Colo. 1998); Hall v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 883, 895-96 (E.D. Va.
1998); Tu lali v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1181 (D. Haw. 1998); United States v. Clark,
29 F. Supp. 2d 869, 870-71 (S.D. Ohio 1998); United States v. Abraham, 29 F. Supp. 2d 296,
209-14 (D.N.J. 1998); United States v. White, 27 F. Supp. 2d 646, 647-49 (E.D.N.C. 1998);
United States v. Hammer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 518, 535-36 (M.D. Pa. 1998); United States v.
Crumpton, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1219 (D. Colo. 1998); United States v. Revis, 22 F. Supp. 2d
1242, 1264 (N.D. Okla. 1998); United States v. McGuire, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1266 (D. Kan.
1998).
17. Trading leniency for testimony is a major tool employed by federal prosecu tors. The
Dallas Morning News reported:
More than 86 percent of a sampling of federal criminal cases in Dallas and Fort
Worth between 1995 and 1997 involved use of informants and co-conspirators who
received deals from prosecutors in return for testimony, according to a review of
nearly 300 cases . . . .
Some of the informants were paid thousands of dollars for their cooperation.
Most received a reduction in the amount of time they would serve in prison for
their crimes. The cases mostly involved drug offenses, illegal-gun charges and vari-
ous white-collar conspiracies.
Mark Curriden, Court to Decide Legality of Rewarding Informants, Experts Say Thousands of
Cases Could Be Jeopardized, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17, 1998, at 1A.
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justice system.” 18 “Accomplice plea agreements tend to produce unreli-
able testimony because they create an incentive for an accomplice to
shift blame to the defendant or other co-conspirators.”19 Quoting the Su-
preme Court in Washington v. Texas,20 the Singleton  dissent noted:
“Common sense would suggest that [an accused accomplice] often has
a greater interest in lying in favor of the prosecution rather than
against it, especially if [the accused accomplice] is still awaiting his
own trial or sentencing. To think that criminals will lie to save their
fellows but not to obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is
indeed to clothe the criminal class with more nobility than one might
expect to find in the public at large.”21
As such, this Note will examine and analyze the major arguments
used by courts to date to justify their respective decisions regarding the
Singleton issue. Part II reviews the two Singleton decisions (the three-
judge panel and en banc review). Part III examines the various major ar-
guments employed by courts to counter the Singleton  panel decision.  In
doing so, Part III offers commentary as to the validity of the counter ar-
guments relating to the statutory construction of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)
and whether the meaning of the word “whoever” applies to the federal
government. Part III also examines the implication presented by federal
legislation binding federal prosecutors to state ethics rules, the structure
of § 201, legislative history, application of the exclusionary rule, and
policy and effect considerations of conflicting interpretations of §
201(c)(2). Part IV concludes, however, that courts have failed to address
the underlying premise of the Singleton panel decision: Government of-
fers of leniency to accomplices or co-conspirators create a real incentive
to lie. Furthermore, as the Singleton  panel noted, the very nature and
complexity of this policy debate reinforces the belief that this is an ar-
gument better left to Congress.
II.   REVIEW OF THE S INGLETON DECISIONS
In April 1992, the government charged Sonya Evette Singleton, a sin-
gle twenty-five-year-old mother of two children, with multiple counts of
money laundering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine for her part in an
alleged drug trafficking operation between California and Wichita, Kan-
sas.22 Subsequently, the government secured a plea agreement with one
of her co-conspirators, Napoleon Douglas, whereby the government
                                                                                                                                                
18. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999) (Kelly, J., dissenting)
(reiterating the policy reasoning behind the panel’s original decision).
19. Yvette A. Beeman, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea Agreements,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 802 (1987).
20. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
21. Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1309 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at
22-23).
22. Allegedly, Ms. Singleton either sent or received eight wire transfers of drug proceeds
in connection with the conspiracy. See  United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1344 (10th Cir.
1998).
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agreed not to prosecute Mr. Douglas for related offenses in exchange for
his testimony against Singleton.23
A.   The Singleton Panel Decision
Before trial, Singleton moved to suppress Mr. Douglas’ testimony ar-
guing that the government had impermissibly promised Mr. Douglas le-
niency in return for testimony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), the
anti-gratuity provision of the federal bribery statute, which prohibits
unlawful inducements to a witness.24
In particular, § 201(c)(2) reads:
Whoever . . . , directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything
of value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or
affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court . . . authorized by
the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony . . .
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two
years, or both.25
“The district court denied the motion, ruling that § 201(c)(2) did not ap-
ply to the government.”26 Accordingly, Mr. Douglas testified against Ms.
Singleton during the trial, and she was found guilty of conspiracy to dis-
tribute cocaine and money laundering.
On appeal, the central issue before the court was whether the gov-
ernment’s conduct was prohibited by § 201(c)(2). 27 Accordingly, on July
1, 1998, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
(hereinafter “the panel”) stunned the criminal justice world by reversing
Ms. Singleton’s conviction28 holding that the prosecuting attorney vio-
lated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) by offering leniency to a co-defendant in ex-
change for testimony.29 In reaching their conclusion to suppress Mr.
                                                                                                                                                
23. The plea agreement stated three specific promises made by the government to Mr.
Douglas in return for his promise to testify:
First, the government promised not to prosecute Mr. Douglas for any other viola-
tions of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act stemming from his activities
currently under investigation, except perjury or related offenses. Second, it prom-
ised, “to advise the sentencing court, prior to sentencing, of the nature and extent
of the cooperation provided” by Mr. Douglas. Third, the government promised, “to
advise the Mississippi parole board of the nature and extent of the cooperation pro-
vided” by Mr. Douglas. Mr. Douglas agreed, “in consideration of the items listed . . .
[to] testify[ ] truthfully in federal and/or state court . . . .”
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
24. See  id.  at 1343; Singleton’s attorney, John V. Wachtel, “credits the idea to an article by
J. Richard Johnston of Johnston, Horton, Roberts & Hand in Oakland, Calif[ornia]. The article,
titled, ‘Paying the Witness: Why is it OK for the prosecution, but not the defense?’ [sic] ap -
peared in the Winter 1997 issue of [an ABA Magazine] Criminal Justice  . . . .” Cynthia L. Coo-
per, Lets Not Make a Deal, A.B.A. J.,  Sept. 1998, at 34.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
26. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.
27. See  id.  at 1344. Other issues before the court were whether the government’s conduct
was prohibited by KANSAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (b); “whether Mr. Douglas’
testimony should have been suppressed” if in violation of § 201(c)(2) or 3.4(b); and “whether
the record contains sufficient evidence to remand for a new trial.” Id.
  28. See  id.  at 1361.
  29. See  id.  at 1351.
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Douglas’ testimony and reverse Ms. Singleton’s conviction,30 the three
judge panel, composed of Chief Judge Stephanie K. Seymour, Judge
David M. Ebel, and Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr., focused on four major areas
of analysis. 31
First, in focusing on the language and structure of § 201(c)(2), the
panel broadly defined “anything of value,” declaring that Congress did
not intend to limit this phrase to monetary damages but sought to in-
clude things such as potential reduction in jail times or leniency, so that
the plain meaning of § 201(c)(2)’s prohibition encompasses federal
prosecutors.32 Secondly, the panel rejected the government’s argument
that a traditional law enforcement justification—the end justifies the
means—warrants excluding the government from § 201(c)(2), finding no
such basis for this reasoning.33 Next, the panel very convincingly recon-
ciled § 201(c)(2) with other statutes that the government claimed con-
flicted with the panel’s interpretation of § 201(c)(2).34 Finally, the panel
concluded that the appropriate remedy for the testimony obtained in
violation of § 201(c)(2) was suppression of the testimony at Ms. Single-
ton’s trial.35
B.   The Singleton En Banc Decision
Nine days after the panel decision, however, the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, acting sua sponte, swiftly vacated
the panel decision so it could address the issue en banc.36 Not so unex-
pectedly, on January 8, 1999, an en banc panel of the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that “18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) does not apply to the United States or
to an Assistant United States Attorney functioning within the official
scope of the office.”37 In a relatively short opinion and analysis, Judge
Porfilio, writing for the majority, reasoned that although the prohibi-
tions of § 201(c)(2) literally encompass “whoever,” such a reading would
restrict the power of the United States and yield absurd results by con-
flicting with other federal statutes.38
In the more compelling concurring opinion, Judge Lucero, with
Judge Henry joining, agreed with the Singleton panel’s reasoning that
the word “whoever” does not exclude federal prosecutors.39 However,
Judge Lucero further reasoned that specific related statutes allow the
government to trade leniency for a witness’ testimony. These specific
statutes conflict with the general prohibitions of § 201(c)(2); thus, the
                                                                                                                                                
30. See  id.  at 1361.
31. See  id.  at 1343.
32. See  id.  at 1348-51.
33. See  id.  at 1352-54.
34. See  id.  at 1354-56.
35. See  id.  at 1359-61.
36. See  id.  at 1361-62.
37. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 2371 (U.S. June 21, 1999) (No. 98-8758).
38. See  id.  at 1299-1302.
39. See  id.  at 1303-05 (Lucero, J., concurring); see also United States v. Singleton: Bad
Law Made in the Name of a Good Cause, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 749, 772-73 (1999) (suggesting
that the Singleton en banc majority decision relied on “strained reasoning, placing it on unfirm
ground,” failing to produce a satisfactory result).
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conflicting specific statutes control and permit the prosecution’s action
in this case.40
The same three-judge panel that issued the first Singleton opinion
dissented41 and lauded the court’s role as “law-interpreting” rather than
“lawmaking.”42 The panel insisted that the plain language of § 201(c)(2)’s
prohibitions encompassed government officials.43 Opining that trading
leniency for testimony creates dangerous incentives for witnesses to pro-
vide false testimony, the panel noted that “bought testimony is so
fraught with the potential for perjury that Congress imposed a blanket
prohibition that also applies to the government.” 44 In its final analysis,
the panel reasoned that “it remains completely open for Congress to
reweigh the conflicting values sought to be addressed in § 201[(c)(2)].”45
II.    ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS EMPLOYED BY THE COURTS TO ANSWER
THE “S INGLETON ISSUE”
A.   Statutory Construction of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2): The Meaning of
“Whoever”
A large part of the debate surrounding whether the prohibitions of §
201(c)(2) include the United States government concerns the meaning of
the word “whoever.” In pertinent part, § 201(c)(2) reads:
(c) Whoever . . .
(2) directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to
any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation
given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial . . . before
any court . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more
than two years, or both.46
In what can only be termed “the battle of the dictionaries,” courts
have used various interpretations of the meaning of the word “whoever”
to arrive at differing conclusions as to the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).
The Singleton panel relied on the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, for the
definition of “whoever”, which “includes, but is not limited to, corpora-
tions, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies—all inanimate objects.”47 Accordingly, the Singleton
panel correctly reasoned that “whoever” should logically extend to the
government.48
                                                                                                                                                
40. See  Singleton, 165 F. 3d at 1305-07 (Lucero, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 1308.
42. Id. at 1309.
43. See  id.  at 1308 (dissenting opinion).
44. Id. at 1311.
45. Id. at 1310.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
47. Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1310 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
48. See  id. Curiously, one district court has also held that the plain meaning of “whoever”
does include the government saying, however, that leniency is not among those “gratuities that
have an obvious potential to corrupt testimony” and thus is “not a thing of value” as prohibited
by § 201(c)(2). United States v. Medina, 41 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47 (D. Mass. 1999).
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However, in rejecting the Singleton panel’s decision and reasoning
that because the Dictionary Act definition does not expressly include the
United States Government, the D.C. circuit reached the opposite conclu-
sion.49 Also rejecting the Singleton panel decision, the en banc majority
referred to Webster’s Dictionary to find that “‘whoever’ connotes a be-
ing,” and since “[t]he United States is an inanimate entity,” § 201(c)(2)
cannot apply to the United States Government.50 Therefore, apparently
“whoever” does not mean whoever if the “whoever” is a government offi-
cer.51
1.   Nardone Analysis
Fortunately, the statutory construction analysis employed by the
courts advances beyond “the battle of the dictionaries” and becomes
substantive but no less conflicted. In one of the most reasoned opinions
of those addressing the Singleton issue, Judge Lucero (concurring in the
Singleton en banc decision), cited Nardone v. United States.52 In Nar-
done, the Supreme Court held that a federal wiretapping statute, which
used a term of general applicability (no person), included government
agents.53 Accordingly, Judge Lucero analogized that a similar statement
of “general applicability” in § 201(c)(2) (“whoever”) should logically en-
compass the government also.54
In yet more sophisticated analysis, several courts have employed the
so-called “Nardone  analysis.” The Nardone Court identified two classes
of statutes wherein general terms of applicability, like “whoever,” do not
apply to the government.55 The first class includes statutes that, “if not so
limited, would deprive the sovereign of a recognized or established pre-
rogative title or interest.”56 The second class includes statutes which,
when interpreted to include government officers, “would work [an] ob-
vious absurdity.”57 Accordingly, if 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) is interpreted to
fall in either or both of these statutory “classes,” the statute then is inap-
plicable to the government.
Concerning the first class, the Singleton en banc majority recognized
“[f]rom the common law . . . a longstanding practice sanctioning the tes-
timony of accomplices against their confederates in exchange for leni-
                                                                                                                                                
49. See  United State v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
50. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (en banc) cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (U.S. June 21, 1999)
(No. 98-8758).
51. Georgetown University Law Professor, Paul Rothstein, commented, “The [Singleton
en banc] majority opinion appears to give the words an illogical reading in order to preserve a
practice it feels is necessary and desirable for law enforcement purposes and society in general.”
Mark Hansen, Shot Down in Mid Theory , A.B.A. J. , May 1999, at 51. In addition, one court has
perceptively pointed out a further absurdity with this interpretation: “the [Singleton en banc]
majority thereby exempts from the coverage of 201(c)(2) corporations, associations, and all
other ‘artificial persons’ which are as much inanimate entities as the United States.” United
States v. Medina, 41 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46 n.25 (D. Mass. 1999).
52. 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (noting the use of the term “no person” in the federal wiretapping
statute).
53. See  id.  at 380-83.
54. See  Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1310 (Lucero, J., concurring).
55. See  Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383-84.
56. Id. at 383.
57. Id. at 384.
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ency.”58 “This ingrained practice,” the court reasoned, “has created a
‘vested sovereign prerogative’ in the government.”59 Therefore, according
to the majority, § 201(c)(2) “would deprive the sovereign of a recognized
or established prerogative, title, or interest.” According to the Singleton
en banc majority, § 201(c)(2) cannot, therefore, be read to include the
government.60
The court’s analysis, however, fails to acknowledge an important ca-
veat established by the Nardone Court: “the sovereign exclusion rule ap-
plies less stringently when applied to government servants or agents
rather than to the sovereign itself.”61 Cou ntering, the en banc majority’s
opinion that United States Attorneys are sovereign, Judge Lucero cor-
rectly reasoned: “For purposes of Nardone, United States Attorneys
must be regarded as agents of the government, not as its alter egos.”62
Regarding the second class of Nardone cases—“where public officers
are impliedly excluded from language embracing all persons . . . [because
such a reading] would work obvious absurdity”63—the Singleton en banc
majority simply relied on various district court decisions to conclude
that the panel’s reading of § 201(c)(2) would create an “absurdity” in re-
lation to other statutes.64 Nevertheless, whether such an absurdity is ac-
tually created is not so clear, and the Singleton panel persuasively recon-
ciled any potential conflict.65
In his concurring opinion, Judge Lucero agreed with the panel that
an interpretation of § 201(c)(2) that includes the government does not
yield an obvious absurdity.66 Again, Judge Lucero offered persuasive
analysis regarding not only statutory construction of § 201(c)(2), but also
concerning the application of “whoever” to other subparts of § 201.67 Ac-
cordingly, Judge Lucero correctly notes that part of the purpose of § 201
is, in fact, to criminalize certain behaviors of government officials.68 The
government itself recognized that a prosecutor may be found in violation
of §201(b)(3) by corruptly bribing a witness for the witness’ testimony.
Section 201(b)(3) also uses the word “whoever.”69 Thus, “if whoever can
refer to government agents in one part of the statute, then it can surely
refer to government agents in § 201(c)(2).”70
Although the plain meaning of “whoever” would seem to include even
the government, the diversity in opinion among the circuits in regarding
                                                                                                                                                




61. Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383.
62. See  Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1304 (Lucero, J., concurring).
63. Nardone, 302 U.S. at 384.
64. See  Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1304 (Lucero, J., concurring).
65. See  infra text accompanying notes 72-102.
66. See  Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1304 (Lucero, J., concurring).
67. See  id.  at 1305.
68. See  id.
69. See  18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (Supp. 1998); Singleton 165 F.3d at 1305.
70. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Lucero, J., concurring). Judge Lucero also refered to
another inconsistent reading of § 201 by the en banc Singleton majority. For example, §
201(b)(2) and § 201(c)(1)(B) limit their scope to “public official[s].” Lucero correctly noted that
Congress could have included the same limiting expression in § 201(c)(2) had it desired. See id.
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the statute’s construction illustrates that § 201(c)(2) may not mean what
it says. A court’s disposition regarding the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers is likely to influence its interpretation. Courts inclined toward judi-
cial restraint and respect for Congress’ legislative function will not be in-
clined to exclude the government from § 201(c)(2). In light of the Sin-
gleton panel’s persuasive analysis, this appears to be the correct position
for the court to take. As the Singleton panel mindfully pointed out, the
“court must perform its own constitutional duties and no more. Ours is
not to explore the farthest meanings that the term ‘whoever’ can bear so
as to effectuate the policy we think best. Our duty is to interpret the plain
meaning of the statute.”71
2.   Application of State Ethics Rules to Federal Prosecutors
The Singleton panel uniquely identified a trend toward requiring fed-
eral prosecutors to abide by state ethics rules as further justification for
including federal prosecutors within the reach of § 201(c)(2).72 Specifi-
cally, the panel reasoned that, “if federal prosecutors are bound . . . [by
state] ethical rule[s], we think it even more clear that they are bound by
a federal statute regulating the evidence presented in federal court.”73
Somewhat unknowingly, Congress may have added fuel to the Sin-
gleton fire when it recently enacted the Citizen Protection Act of 1998,
which statutorily subjects United States Attorneys to state ethics rules.74
This legislation, in effect, nullifies the exemption from state ethics rules
that United States Attorneys enjoyed under former Attorney General
Richard L. Thornburgh.75
It is not entirely clear how this legislation will ultimately affect issues
like those raised in Singleton, but at least one commentator has sug-
gested that since state ethics rules may be interpreted as more restrictive
than applicable federal rules, state ethics laws may potentially preclude
prosecutors from obtaining witness testimony through promises of leni-
ency.76 Demonstrative of this notion is the Singleton panel’s conclusion
that the government also violated Kansas Professional Rule  3.4(b) in
presenting Napoleon Douglas’ testimony against Ms. Singleton.77 As the
                                                                                                                                                
71. Id. at 1310 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
72. See  Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1354 (citing United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132
F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that federal prosecutors are bound to state ethics rule
regarding ex parte contact in the course of a prosecution); see also United States v. Lopez, 4
F.3d 1455, 1458-63 (9th Cir. 1993).
73. See  Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1354.
74. See  Citizen Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-118 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
75. See  Thornburgh Memorandum, 28 C.F.R. pt. 77 (1997) (decreeing that Department of
Justice lawyers were not subject to state ethics rules when the lawyers acted in their capacity of
federal attorneys enforcing federal law); see also  Cramtandl Udell, State Ethics Rules and Fed-
eral Prosecutors: The Controversies Over the Anti-contact and Subpoena Rules , 53 U. PITT . L.
REV. 291 (1992); ABA Formal Opinion 95-396, Is DOJ Above the Rules?, A.B.A. J. , Nov. 1997, at
26.
76. See  Richard C. Montgomery, Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors, 147 PITT .
LEGAL J.  9, 9 (1999); see generally David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecu tor’s
Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 537-38 (1999) (comparing the Singleton issue to the Starr
Referral).
77. See  Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1358-59.
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court noted, “The rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Kansas, pro-
vides, ‘A lawyer shall not . . . offer an inducement to a witness that is
prohibited by law.’” 78 Moreover, the commentary to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct—also adopted by the Supreme Court of Kan-
sas—states: “The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is im-
proper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying . . . .”79 Recog-
nizing that a promise of leniency may be of equal or, perhaps, greater
value than cash and a even greater incentive to offer false testimony, the
court concluded that the government also violated Kansas Rule 3.4(b).80
Indeed, when it comes to state ethics rules, “whoever” does appear to in-
clude United States Attorneys.
B.   The Structure of § 201
Unchallenged by any court is the Singleton panel’s argument that the
inherent structure of § 201 itself supports the panel’s interpretation.81
The panel argued that construction of a particular part of a statute is
supported by the language and structure of the statute as a whole. 82 In
particular, § 201 addresses corruption of public officials and witnesses.83
Bribery prohibitions are collected under § 201(b)(1) and require corrup-
tion on the part of the giver and intent to influence the receiver’s ac-
tion.84 On the other hand, the gratuity provisions collected under §
201(c) contain no requirements of corruption or intent to influence the
receiver.85
The Singleton panel reasoned, “Congress thus deliberately included
the corruptness and intent-to-influence elements in § 201(b)(3) and ex-
cluded them from § 201(c)(2).” 86 Though it did not expand on this issue,
apparently the court implied that a federal prosecutor need not have any
corrupt motive or intent to influence to violate § 201(c)(2). The implica-
tion would sweep in the huge majority of leniency-for-testimony bar-
gains that the panel argued occur as a matter of course in federal prose-
cutions, in violation of § 201(c)(2).87
The panel further commented that “the predecessor statute to §
201(c)(2) did require an agreement that the testimony would be influ-
enced by a thing of value.”88 However, the panel reasoned that since
“Congress deliberately deleted [this] language . . . it is not our place to
reinsert it.” 89 Again, the panel suggested that Congress consciously re-
                                                                                                                                                
78. Id.
79. KANSAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) cmt. (1997).
80. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1359.
81. See  id.  at 1351.
82. See  id .
83. See  18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (Supp. 1998).
84. See  id.  § 201(b)(1).
85. See  id.  § 201(c).
86. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1351.
87. See  id.
88. Id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1952)).
89. Id.
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moved testimony from the list of valid items for which the government
can offer a witness a thing of value.90
The court then referred to § 201(d):
Paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) and paragraphs (2) and (3) of
subsection (c) shall not be construed to prohibit the payment or re-
ceipt of witness fees provided by law, or the payment, by the party
upon whose behalf a witness is called and receipt by a witness, of the
reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and the reasonable
value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing, or proceed-
ing, or in the case of expert witnesses, a reasonable fee for time spent
in the preparation of such opinion, and in appearing and testifying.91
Here the panel reasoned: “The existence of § 201(d) as a specific ex-
ception to § 201(c)(2) indicates that § 201(c)(2) would otherwise prohibit
travel and other witness fees, which are given to witnesses because of
their testimony.”92 Thus, Congress specifically made the effort to identify
items that were not included under the prohibition of § 201(c)(2), and
leniency was not among them.93
C.   Section 201(c)(2) in Relation to Other Statutes
One argument the government forwarded against the panel’s decision
was that § 201(c)(2) operates in conjunction with other statutes to allow
the government, upon proper disclosure and/or court approval, to trade
certain items of value for testimony.94 Judge Lucero, in the en banc
court’s concurring opinion, and Judge Batchelder in the Sixth Circuit,
each presented persuasive arguments favoring the government’s posi-
tion by arguing that the panel’s interpretation of § 201(c)(2) would con-
flict with an “extensive and detailed statutory framework [developed by
Congress] authorizing sentence reductions and recommendations, im-
munity, and other incentives for cooperating witnesses.”95 The Eighth
and D.C. Circuits employed similar reasoning in rejecting the panel’s de-
cision.96 The Singleton panel, contrary to the government’s contention,
maintained their ground in suggesting that their reading of § 201(c)(2)
could be reconciled with related statutes.97
                                                                                                                                                
90. See  id.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) (Supp. 1998).
92. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1352.
93. See  id. (noting that witness fees, reasonable cost of travel and subsistence, reasonable
value of lost time, and expert witness fees are not prohibited).
94. See  United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1303 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) cert. de-
nied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (U.S. June 21, 1999) (No. 98-8758); see also United States v. Ware, 161
F.3d 414, 422 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Johnson, F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
95. Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1305 (Lucero, J., concurring); Ware, 161 F.3d at 422. Judge
Porfilio, in the en banc majority opinion, merely cited district court cases (United States v.
Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 718-19 (E.D. Mich. 1998), United States v. Dunlap, 17 F. Supp. 2d
1183, 1184-86 (D. Colo. 1998), and United States v. Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1334 (S.D.
Fla. 1998)) and said: “We simply believe the general principles we have set forth so completely
undercut defendant’s reading that further exposition would be redundant.” Singleton, 165 F.3d
1297, at 1302.
96. See  Johnson, 167 F.3d at 1098; Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 990.
97. See  Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1354-56.
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1.   Section 201(c)(2) vs. The Sentencing Reform Act
In their analysis, courts opposing the Singleton  panel examined sev-
eral related statutes that seemingly conflict with the panel’s interpreta-
tion of § 201(c)(2). First, the courts looked at several statutes associated
with the Sentencing Reform Act98, enacted by Congress in 1984, which
established the United States Sentencing Commission, charged with the
duty of promulgating and distributing sentencing guidelines to the fed-
eral courts.99 The Act explicitly requires the Commission to ensure that
the guidelines reflect “the general appropriateness of imposing a lower
sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence that is
lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take
into account a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.”100
One sentencing statute further provides that, “Upon motion of the
Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence
below the level established by statute as a minimum sentence to reflect a
defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense.” 101 Furthermore, the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 35(b), allows the court, on mo-
tion of the Government, made within one year of the imposition of sen-
tence to “reduce a sentence to reflect a defendant’s subsequent, sub-
stantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense.”102
The guidelines themselves also contain language that governs down-
ward departures of defendants who provide “substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed
an offense.”103 Additionally, as pointed out by the Sixth Circuit, “Included
in the factors that the court may consider in determining whether to
grant the motion for downward departure . . . is the truthfulness, com-
pleteness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by
the defendant.”104 As the Sixth Circuit concluded, “[t]o apply the general
language of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) to federal prosecutors in the face of the
specific provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing
Guidelines is absurd.”105
The Singleton  panel countered this argument by saying that each of
these statutes only authorizes that substantial assistance can be re-
warded after it is rendered.”106 In reconciling this interpretation with the
related sentencing statutes, the Singleton  panel rationalized that the
                                                                                                                                                
98. See  id.  at 1354.
99. See  28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (Supp. 1998).
100. Id. § 994(n) (emphasis added).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
102. FED. R. CRIM . P. 35(b) (1998) (emphasis added).
103. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998).
104. United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 422 (6th Cir. 1998).
105. Id.
106. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1344, 1355 (10th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added),
rev’d en banc , 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (U.S. June 21, 1999)
(No. 98-8758).
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term “substantial assistance” does not include testimony. 107 Dubiously,
however, the Singleton panel conveniently chose to ignore the language
of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines  § 5K1.1(a)(2), which explicitly mentions
that factors to be considered in reduction of a witnesses’ sentence are
“the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant.”108 But in its subsequent dissent,
the panel backtracked and noted that § 5K1.1 apparently creates a nar-
row exception to § 201(c)(2) by permitting a court to reward a defen-
dant’s truthful testimony after it has been given. 109 Thus, the panel went
on to say, “This narrow exception does not affect § 201(c)(2)’s prohibi-
tion against the prosecutor offering or promising leniency in advance to
a defendant in exchange for his agreement to testify.” 110 This apparent
weakness in the panel’s argument certainly cuts against their interpreta-
tion of § 201(c)(2), but again highlights the inherent conflict between the
language of § 201(c)(2) and related sentencing statutes.
2.   Section 201(c)(2) vs. Federal Immunity Statutes
The Sixth Circuit and Judge Lucero also identified 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-
05, enacted in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime Control Act, as con-
flicting with the panel’s interpretation of § 201(c)(2).111 These federal
immunity statutes authorize prosecutors to request immunity for coop-
erating witnesses. 112 “Section 6003 specifically authorizes a United States
Attorney . . . [with appropriate approval] to request from a United States
district court an order granting immunity to a witness whose testimony
the United States Attorney considers necessary in the public interest.”113
The Sixth Circuit presumed that there could be no purpose to grant im-
munity except to obtain testimony 114 and somewhat derisively com-
mented: “Do we then assume that the Congress enacted these immunity
provisions with the intention that they be utilized by the United States
Attorneys under pain of criminal sanction?”115
The Singleton  panel countered by noting that its reading of §
201(c)(2) can be harmonized with 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05.116 The panel
distinguished the federal immunity statutes from other related statutes,
noting that “[t]hese statutes allow the government to compel an unwill-
ing witness to cooperate by precluding use of the Fifth Amendment
privilege” against self-incrimination under a grant of immunity.117
Again, the panel’s argument has merit. Sections 6001-05 indeed pro-
vide a mechanism to strip away a defendant’s right not to incriminate
                                                                                                                                                
107. See  id.
108. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5K1.1(a)(2) (1998) (emphasis added).
109. See  Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1313 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. See  United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 422 (6th Cir. 1998); Singleton, 165 F.3d at
1305 (Lucero, J., concurring).
112. See  18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (Supp. 1998).
113. Ware, 161 F.3d at 422.
114. See  id.
115. Id.
116. See  Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1313 (Kelly, J. dissenting).
117. See  id.
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himself, and in return, grant that defendant immunity.118 There seems to
be no incentive for a witness to color his testimony—he already has com-
plete immunity from prosecution. This does not seem to be the case
where, as the Singleton  panel points out, the government is “purchasing
voluntary testimony with leniency.”119
3.   § 201(c)(2) vs. The Witness Relocation and Protection Act
In his concurrence, Judge Lucero further identified a conflict between
the panel’s reading of § 201(c)(2) and the Witness Protection Act,120
which expressly authorizes the Attorney General to provide for reloca-
tion and protection of certain federal witnesses.121 Because the Witness
Protection Act allows the government to provide “numerous thing[s] of
value,”122 including housing and living expenses, in exchange for testi-
mony,123 the Act’s effect seemingly contradicts the panel’s reasoning re-
garding § 201(c)(2).
As expected, however, the Singleton panel responded and indicated
that no conflict exists with the Witness Relocation and Protection Act.124
Rather, the panel concluded, “section 3521 is primarily concerned with
the welfare of the witness, not with obtaining testimony.”125 Interest-
ingly, the panel also noted that § 201(c)(2) does not conflict with Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1), which permits plea agreements.126
According to the panel, “Rule 11(e) does not concern a defendant’s testi-
mony—it simply permits a defendant to bypass trial,” and the reward, if
any, is for admitting his guilt—not for testimony.127 Although a broad
reading of related statutes seems to indicate that their collective “spirit”
conflicts with the panel’s interpretation of § 201(c)(2), a literal reading
does not totally undermine the Singleton panel’s reading of § 201(c)(2).
D.   Inconclusive Legislative History
The Singleton panel attempted to employ arguably scarce legislative
history to support its argument, before finally concluding, “We find no
clearly expressed legislative intention contradicting the statute’s lan-
guage.”128 The Singleton en banc court, however, failed to consider any
relevant legislative history, and the court only commented, “we must
presume if Congress had intended that section 201(c)(2) overturn this
ingrained aspect of American legal culture, it would have done so in
clear, unmistakable and unarguable language.”129
                                                                                                                                                
118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (Supp. 1998).
119. Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1313 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 3521(a) (Supp. 1998).
121. See  id.  §§ 3521(b)(1)(B),(D).
122. Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1306 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521 (b)(1)(B),(D)).
123. See  18 U.S.C. §§ 3521 (b)(1)(B),(D).
124. See  id.
125. Id.
126. See  FED. R. CRIM . P. 11(e)(1); Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1306 (Lucero, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1352 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d en banc , 165
F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (U.S. June 21, 1999) (No. 98-8758).
129. Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1302.
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The Sixth and D.C. Circuits did, however, offer argument to counter
the Singleton  panel’s reading of § 201(c)(2)’s legislative history.130 In
particular, the Sixth Circuit noted “that nothing in the legislative history
[of § 201(c)(2)] indicates it applies to prosecutors.”131 Also, the court cor-
rectly noted:
Though S.R. Rep. 87-2213, which mirrors the language of H.R. Rep.
87-748, notes in the section-by-section analysis that subsection (h) of
§ 201 (the predecessor of (c)(2)) “forbids offers of payments to a wit-
ness of anything of value ‘for or because of’ testimoney given or to be
given,” that is the extent of the analysis.132
“The legislative history is void of any declaration that [Public Law Num-
ber] 87-849 was intended to thwart the long-sanctioned prosecutorial
prerogative challenged by [the defendant] in this case.”133
Furthermore, as pointed out by the Sixth and D.C. Circuits, “the leg-
islative history of the 1970, 1986 and 1994 amendments to section 201 is
also silent on the issue.”134 If Congress had intended to abolish such a
pervasive practice would they not have said so? In addition, these
amendments are deafeningly silent regarding the resulting contradiction
with other statutes. As the D.C. Circuit notes, “the 1986 and 1994
amendments [to § 201] were passed after 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (reduction
below statutory minimum sentence), 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (immunity stat-
ute) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (requiring Sentencing Commission to allow
sentencing guideline reductions) but the potential conflict with these
statutes was never addressed” in the legislative history of either one of
these subsequent amendments to § 201.135 Not surprised to find the ab-
sence of this discussion regarding conflict with other statutes in any leg-
islative history of § 201, both the D.C. and Sixth Circuits explain “that no
such conflict exists as § 201(c)(2) was never intended to apply to the
government.”136
E.   Application of the Exclusionary Rule
The Singleton panel’s remedy for the testimony obtained in violation
of § 201(c)(2) was suppression of its use in Ms. Singleton’s trial137, de-
spite the fact that the statute already provides specific remedies—fines or
incarceration—for any violation of § 201(c)(2).138 The basis of the panel’s
decision to exclude the evidence centers around the assumption that a
                                                                                                                                                
130. See  United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d at 423-24 (6th Cir. 1998); see also United States v.
Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
131. Ware, 161 F.3d at 423.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 991; see also Ware, 161 F.3d at 423.
135. See  Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 991.
136. Ware, 161 F.3d at 423; (citing Act of Oct. 27, 1986 ch. 570 § 1007, 100 Stat. 3207-7
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1994); Act of Nov. 10, 1986 ch. 546 § 48, 100
Stat. 3605 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994)); see also Ramsey , 165 F.3d at
991.
137. See  18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).
138. See  United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d en banc, 165
F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (U.S. June 21, 1999) (No. 98-8758).
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“violation of § 201(c)(2) . . . directly taint[s] the reliability of the evi-
dence.”139 Further, the panel reasoned that application of the exclusion-
ary rule is “necessary to remove the incentive to disregard the statute”
and to protect “the imperative of judicial integrity.” 140
Although the Singleton en banc court chose not to address the issue,
at least two courts have said that even if the statute encompasses federal
prosecutors, there is no basis for applying the exclusionary rule.141 Fur-
ther, countering the Singleton  panel’s position that the judicial process
becomes tainted by the admission of “purchased testimony,” the Sixth
Circuit noted:
“[T]he disclosure of the plea agreements to defense before trial, cross-
examination of cooperating witnesses, and jury instructions all pro-
vide opportunity to ferret out false testimony that an interested wit-
ness might give because of a government promise.”142
. . . .
. . . [E]ven if we could make the great leap necessary to include
prosecuting attorneys within the scope of § 201(c)(2), we would not
apply the exclusionary rule to suppress the testimony of coopera ting
accomplices. Congress has provided the penalties for violations of this
statute and extension of the exclusionary rule is not appropriate.143
Enlisting a separation of powers argument, the court noted that
“where Congress has both established a right and provided exclusive
remedies for its violation, we would ‘encroach upon the prerogatives’ of
Congress were we to authorize a remedy not provided for by statute.”144
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit argued, “statutory violations, absent any
underlying constitutional violations or rights, are generally insufficient
to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule.”145 The court, however, did
acknowledge that the exclusionary rule has been applied to remedy
statutory violations, but that “these cases typically implicate underlying
constitutional rights such as the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure.”146 The D.C. Circuit adds, “the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the ‘substantial’ cost of exclusion which ‘hamper[s]’ the
enforcement of valid laws and keeps ‘concededly relevant and reliable
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142. See  Ware, 161 F.3d at 424 (quoting United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537
(E.D. Va. 1998)).
143. Id. at 425.
144. Id. at 424 (quoting United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986)).
145. Id. (citing United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1991)).
146. Id. (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) (“excluding money seized be-
cause federal officers violated 18 U.S.C. § 3109 by breaking through a door without indicating
their authority and purpose to arrest”)). The Sixth Circuit went on to add:
[T]he Miller Court was at pains to emphasize with regard to the statute at issue
there that “Congress, codifying a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law, has
declared in § 3109 the reverence of the law for the ind ividual’s right of privacy in
his house.”. . . No such tradition exists with r egard to 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).
Id. at 425 n.6 (citation omitted).
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evidence’ from the jury,” and, thus, assuming federal prosecutors were
subject to § 201(c)(2), that fact would not justify excluding a co-
conspirator’s testimony. 147 Recognizing that no such underlying consti-
tutional right or common law tradition exists with regard to § 201(c)(2),
and that Congress has already provided for specific remedies, both the
Sixth and D.C. Circuits have correctly asserted that applying the exclu-
sionary rule to § 201(c)(2) is inappropriate. 148
F.   Policy and Effect Considerations of Conflicting Interpretations of §
201(c)(2)
Several courts have countered the Singleton panel’s interpretation of
§ 201(c)(2) by arguing that such an interpretation conflicts with in-
grained practices of law enforcement and would severely hamper the
prosecutorial function—amounting to a bad overall policy.149 Indeed
prosecutors have historically traded leniency for testimony without
much interference from the courts.150 The Fifth Circuit noted that the
policy of exchanging leniency for testimony is historically rooted in the
English common law,151 and “[t]o interpret section 201(c)(2) [as the Sin-
gleton panel did] would apply shackles to the government in its pursuit
to enforce the law.”152 The court also noted that “frequently the most
knowledgeable witnesses available to testify about criminal activity are
other co-conspirators.”153 Incredibly, the court argued that the “end jus-
tifies the means,” by noting, “often, there are situations where these in-
dividuals are the only credible witnesses, and without the ability to use
their testimony the government would not be able to obtain a convic-
tion.”154
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has noted that inclusion of the government
within the reach of § 201(c)(2) would significantly impact the prosecu-
tor’s ability to prosecute:
It is an occupational hazard of prosecutors that to prove the guilt of a
criminal defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, they often must rely
on the testimony of other criminal defendants, many of whom are less
than enthusiastic about assisting the prosecution. To now deprive
prosecutors of all accomplice or co-defendant testimony except that
which is voluntarily provided without hope of benefit to the volunteer,
would be to seriously undermine the ability of prosecutors to prose-
cute.155
                                                                                                                                                
147. United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976)).
148. See  Ware, 161 F.3d at 425; see also Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 991.
149. See  United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 366-67 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Ware, 161
F.3d at 423.
150. See generally  Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1992) (discussing history of cooperation agreements between prosecutors and
defendants).
151. See  Haese, 162 F.3d at 367.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 366 (citing United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 196 (1st Cir. 1985)).
154. Id. at 367.
155. United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 423 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Moreover, in his concurrence, Judge Lucero adds, “barring a prosecutor
from discussing leniency prior to testimony would seriously inhibit the
intended effect of those statutes by reducing the pool of defendants
willing to testify against their co-conspirators.”156 Any propensity for a
witness to be untruthful so as to increase his chances of receiving leni-
ency, courts have said, is offset by the disclosure to the jury of such an
arrangement, the availability of cross examination, and relevant jury in-
structions.157
The panel, however, countered much of its opposition’s reliance on
the common law practice of sanctioning the testimony of accomplices
against their co-conspirators in exchange for leniency, with two other
equally compelling traditions and policies: 1) “the common law prohibi-
tion against paying fact witnesses” and 2) “the fundamental policy of en-
suring a level playing field between the government and a defendant in a
criminal case.”158
In United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco,159 the Fifth Circuit pointedly
previewed the panel’s contention that “it is difficult to imagine a greater
motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence.”160 Indeed,
the disturbing possibility of pervasive false testimony offered under a
plea agreement is not a novel concern raised by the Singleton panel.
United States District Court Judge John Gleeson articulated that the
United States Sentencing Guidelines have given “prosecutors the key to
sentencing leniency.” 161 Moreover, defendants confronted by cooperating
witnesses face the real “danger that the details provided by the witness
will be tailored to conform to the prosecutor’s expectations.”162 The Sin-
gleton panel cited disturbing authority supporting the notion that a wit-
ness’ natural tendency toward self-preservation would fuel an underly-
ing motive to please the prosecutor with his testimony.163 A witness co-
operating with the prosecution “will know that he has no chance to gain
immunity or leniency unless the information that he initially furnishes
[and subsequently testifies to] appears weighty enough to aid in con-
victing a target.”164
                                                                                                                                                
156. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1307 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Lucero, J.,
concurring), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 2371 (U.S. June 21, 1999) (No. 98-8758).
157. See  Ware, 161 F.3d at 424. Note, however, at least one court opposing the panel’s deci-
sion, has openly expressed “substantial concerns as to whether the practice of exchanging . . .
leniency for testimony is ‘adequately’ controlled” by these mechanisms. United States v.
Medina, 41 F. Supp. 2d 38, 50 (D. Mass. 1999).
158. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1313 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
159. 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987).
160. Id. at 315.
161. John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the Super-
visory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POL’Y  423, 424 (1997).
162. Id. at 457.
163. See  United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing United
States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1255-57 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that “witness admitted lying in
over thirty different statements motivated by his sense of self-preservation.”); United States v.
Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 680 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that “[a] violation of trust which is influ -
enced by the offer of an intangible service is no less damaging . . . then if the influence was in
the form of a cash kickback.”); United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980)
(“We think it obvious that promises of . . . leniency premised on cooperation in a particular case
may provide a strong inducement to falsify in that case.”).
164. Hughes, supra note 150, at 39.
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Moreover, the panel persuasively argued that the anti-gratuity statute
only limits how the government may prosecute its case by only placing a
restriction on one method of gathering admissible evidence. 165 As such,
the panel soundly rejected “the end justifies the means” argument, of-
fering reasoning that seems to diffuse the hyperbole offered by courts in
opposition to the panel’s decision.166
Quite helpfully, the panel pointed to several viable alternative means
available to prosecutors. First of all, “the government is not precluded
from offering leniency in exchange for information and assistance short
of actual testimony at trial.” 167 This, of course, removes any “taint” from
the trial testimony, yet still rewards the witness for cooperation in the
investigation.168 Secondly, “the government could prosecute accomplices
first, then compel their testimony by subpoena against co-
conspirators.”169 In a footnote, the panel suggested a methodology by
which a prosecutor could enter into a plea agreement with a defendant
under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e), subpoena him to
testify after his guilty plea, and offer any records of his prior statements
made during plea negotiations if they conflict with his testimony.170 Any
leniency offered the witness would only be as a reward for his guilty plea,
not for his testimony. As the panel noted, the defendant’s testimony “is
compelled through subpoena and is not given in exchange for anything
of value.”171 Admittedly, an interpretation that sweeps federal prosecu-
tors under the guise of § 201(c)(2) may challenge law enforcement to
utilize means other than trading leniency for testimony, but is unlikely to
cripple the criminal justice system in the end.
IV.   CONCLUSION
Much to the chagrin of criminal defense lawyers, it appears the out-
pouring of argument, though often tortiously employed, has virtually
extinguished the firestorm ignited by the Singleton  panel. Beneath the
charred remains, however, and still unanswered, is the panel’s primary
contention: accomplice plea agreements tend to produce unreliable tes-
timony because they create an incentive for the testifying witness to shift
blame, reaping the reward of promised leniency from the government.
Given the truth-seeking purpose of the criminal justice system, the Sin-
gleton panel’s plain meaning statutory construction of 18 U.S.C. §
201(c)(2), to include prohibitions against federal prosecutors exchanging
testimony for leniency, seems quite reasonable. Therefore, if § 201(c)(2)
means something other than what it says, Congress should say so—not
                                                                                                                                                
165. See  Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1311-12 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
166. Candidly, however, the panel admitted that accomplices can provide important in for-
mation; thus, interpreting § 201(c)(2) to include federal prosecutors may require some changes




170. See  id . at n.3.
171. Id. Another alternative the panel noted is that “the government could also request that
the district court order an accomplice to testify under a grant of immunity.” See  id.  at 1309-10
(Kelly, J., dissenting).
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the courts. The nature and complexity of the debate reinforces the notion
that Congress should reweigh the values that § 201(c)(2) was intended to
address. Until then, and despite all the cold water dumped on the Sin-
gleton panel’s conclusion, the embers underlying the panel’s decision
will continue to glow.
